Why Do the Terrorist Use the Tactics They Do?

by Kevin

June 13th, 2006

Why did Al-Qaeda hit the Towers? They had nineteen people willing to give their lives and they used them on one spectacular operation. The goal, obviously, was to get the country to over-react and “prove” the Al-Qaeda propaganda true, which Bush certainly did. But that effect was fading even a few months after the attacks. Gitmo, the PATRIOT Act, the monarchial notion of “enemy combatants”, the silly notion that US actions have no impact on people’s opinions of the country, the invasion of Iraq: all of those ideas received significant opposition right from the start. And, frankly, if some group brighter than the neo-cons had been in power at the time, even 9/11 would not have forced the kind of over-reaction Bin Laden was looking for.

On the other hand, if those twelve people had done what the DC snipers had done they could have shut down the eastern seaboard fro weeks, maybe months. Even today, that opportunity still exists. As does the potential to have an Oklahoma City ever couple o weeks in addition to DC sniper style attacks in most major American cities. Fifty dedicated people could wreck havoc on this country for a period of months. So why don’t they?

Do they lack the imagination to resist the lure of “spectacular” attacks like 9/11? If that is the case, that is a frightening thought. If I can see the scenario outlined above, then at least some terrorists can. A shift in leadership or frustration with the pace of existing tactics could change the equation much to our detriment.

Do they not have enough people? That is a cheery thought. The kinds of attacks that we have seen since 9/11 don’t require more than three or four people to carry out. If lack of people is the cause, then that implies the carnage in Iraq is mostly driven by local fights and Iraq is less likely to serve as the jihadist springboard that Afghanistan in the 80s did, assuming that the people fighting now can put down their hatred of the US at the same time they put down their arms in Iraq. Or, it could mean that the carnage in Iraq provides enough easy targets and more opportunity for honing their tactics than riskier attacks in the US.

Do they not care about the United States very much? Are their attacks on the West meant primarily to force the West’s protected regimes in the Middle East to publicly side with the West? Small scale attacks would not serve that purpose - -they don’t have the emotional shock that things like Bali or Madrid or 9/11 do.

So why is it that the terrorist choose terror once every one or two years instead of terror all the time?

Categories: Terrorism |

10 Comments

  1. Kevin T. Keith

    It’s an important question, but I think the answer is that Al Qaeda, at least, has made a strategic decision that occasional spectacular attacks are more effective than continual low-level ones.

    They know that small-scale terrorism has limited effect. If a country is willing to grit it out, they can withstand that sort of thing for a long time. Consider Palestinian terrorists, the IRA, the ETA, Shining Path, the Tamil Tigers. Several of these have had some success in winning concessions, but none has won victory by terrorist means, and most suffered crippling damage, operationally and in public opinion. It’s a losing game, especially for a group without a secure territorial base.

    Al Qaeda has made their aims perfectly clear - they want a complete Western pullout from the Middle East and Islamic countries, and then they will pursue the hardline Islamization of those countries and the destruction of Israel off their own bat. They have stated explicitly they are seeking to ignite a worldwide Islamic uprising in order to force this result. (To some extent they are succeeding.) They know they can’t drive the US out by force of arms. Their strategy is to demonstrate, not that they can defeat the US, but that the US is not all-powerful - that it is possible to oppose the US and survive, and to score some successes in doing so. That will recruit enough supporters that the US *will* be faced with opposition extensive enough to achieve Al Qaeda’s goals - something Al Qaaeda themselves cannot do.

    The spectacular demonstration attacks are classic terrorist tactics - “the propaganda of the deed” - on a large scale. The failure of the US to respond decisively - or even intelligently - is proof that we have weaknesses. Low-level attacks wouldn’t receive the level of worldwide attention that they need to recruit followers, and they wouldn’t sufficiently demonstrate that the US can be hurt. A bomb on a bus doesn’t really hurt the US, even if it kills some of our citizens. But simultaneous attacks on major military, governmental, and economic centers *does* disrupt the US in a major way, while demonstrating that we can be hit in our vital areas. It’s simply a better tactic, for their purposes, than merely harassing us by forcing everybody to go through metal detectors or whatever.

    It takes more planning than you’d think to set up one of those spectacular attacks. They spent years sending the 9/11 terrorists through pilot training, for a mission that took just a few hours to complete. That demonstrates considerable discipline and long-range planning. It took a long time to set up the previous attempted WTC truck bombing, and the airline-hijacking “Bojinka” plot that failed to come off, also. (Note also that two of these attacks were on the same target - the World Trade Center. They pick their targets for a reason.) Al Qaeda has proven that they have the patience and will to spend the time it takes to set up big terrorist events. They’re clearly doing it because they think it makes sense. Unfortunately, I don’t think they’re going to run out of patience, will, or volunteers.

  2. Annoying Old Guy

    KTK, I think you’re far off the mark here. Your error is that you are presuming that Al Qaeda is behaving in a Western, rational way. I do not believe that. Their putative goals are simply a fantasy and the real purpose of their attacks is to achieve not geo-political goals but psychological ones. The important thing is that Al Qaeda is a famous, “glamorous” group of terrorists, the hardest of the hard boys. Everything else is just rhetorical window dressing.

    As Kevin (op) shows, Al Qaeda’s strategy is laughable if their stated goals were their real goals. Everything they’ve done has been counter productive. Just to take one example, which Kevin mentions, that of recruiting jihadis. Al Qaeda has lost their major recruitment / training center (Afghanistan) and is now inolved in a quagmire in Iraq where they cannot leave even as they bleed money, troops, good will, and credibility. Most of their safe havens are lost, the USA now able and willing to strike anywhere on the planet. We only have to get lucky once, they have to get lucky every day. Al Qaeda is evaporating, not growing. This is all the result of their “strategy”. You can claim that they were just about the dumbest gang ever, or ponder whether material success was ever their goal.

  3. Stormy Dragon

    >They had nineteen people willing to give their lives and they
    >used them on one spectacular operation

    Actually, there’s some evidence that most of the 19 had no idea they were on a suicide mission.

  4. Ted

    First off, let’s keep in mind that most of this discussion is based on supposition - a fact Kevin is very upfront with, and AOG seems to disregard. Stating as fact what motivates Al Qaeda, or what their true goals are, is pretty risky business.

    Notwithstanding that, I would hazard a guess that motivation and goals vary significantly from one AQ member to another, and from one faction to another. (Al Qaeda appears to be a very decentralized operation.) It is easy to consider a group of unknown individuals as a monolithic entity with a unitary psyche, and it is a common, if misguided, practice. But I don’t think it often results in valid, useful conclusions.

    The other thing that strikes me is that there are diametrically opposed evaluations of the net effect of the US invasion of Iraq on Al Qaeda. We have either crippled the organization and hastened its demise, or we have energized them and provided ample fodder for future recruiting campaigns. I don’t claim to know the correct answer to this question with certainty, but I am convinced that intimidation and aggression tend to galvanize the resolve of some people against their antagonists. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a pretty compelling case study in this type of behavior.

  5. Kevin T. Keith

    AOG:

    Your error is that you are presuming that Al Qaeda is behaving in a Western, rational way. I do not believe that.

    It’s obvious they go about their actual activities in a planned and rational way. It takes a lot of planning, preparation, and technical skill to do what they have done, and they have been largely successful at achieving the specific, limited goals they have set for themselves in the past. I see no reason to think that they haven’t applied the same abilities to their overall long-range planning as well. Assuming otherwise is just stereotyping - in the face of clear evidence to the contrary.

    Their putative goals are simply a fantasy and the real purpose of their attacks is to achieve not geo-political goals but psychological ones. The important thing is that Al Qaeda is a famous, “glamorous” group of terrorists,

    Their stated goals are unlikely to be achieved, they are not fantasies. Their goals are quite simple: first, removal of Western (especially US) influence from Muslim-dominated regions, and, second, the establishment of their brand of Islam in those regions. The first one is the one they’re mostly working on now. It’s clearly a big goal. And they clearly think they can achieve it - specifically, by raising the cost of staying so high that the Western powers will refuse to pay it. They think they have evidence that that will work (Western public unrest, the Muslim victory - partly through terrorism - in Algeria, the Hindu/Muslim victory in India, and the US habit, since the 1970s, of running from countries that put up a fight). They may be right or wrong, but it’s hardly irrational.

    Note also that their goals are matched by almost precisely symmetrical goals of the Bush administration: to permanently remove radical Islamics from power throughout the Middle East (where they are native, have public support, cannot easily be distinguished from allies, and don’t need to maintain an overseas occupation indefinitely). It’s not irrational to imagine that Al Qaeda’s goals are a lot more realistic than Bush’s. At the very least, it’s no more irrational for them to think they can do to us what Bush is trying to do to them than it is for Bush to entertain the reciprocal fantasy.

    At any rate, their plan can’t be “psychological”, because that gets them nothing. They are living guerilla-warfare-style, undercover or in the bush. Having some sort of reputation among Muslims does not translate into any kind of influence they can use, because they don’t work openly. But achieving their actual, stated aim - driving foreigners out of Muslim lands - does have a purpose. It also seems to be what they’re actually trying to do. It makes a lot more sense to just believe they mean what they say.

    We only have to get lucky once, they have to get lucky every day.

    You’re aware that this is precisely the opposite of the slogan the Homeland Security people keep using? And if by “get lucky once” you’re referring to some sort of decisive military victory, that’s clearly false. We’ve already done that many times - as recently as three days ago, didn’t you hear? - and it has no effect.

    As for the rest of your comment, it adds up to the claim that we’re winning and Al Qaeda is getting weaker. That would be fine except that we now don’t control any more of Afghanistan than we did after the initial bombings, and Al Qaeda recruits continue to pour into Iraq in response to Bush’s invitation to “bring it on”. The “progress” in Iraq consists largely of naming things and declaring that they represent problems solved: there’s now a government (that doesn’t control its own streets, and whose security forces are in the employment of private warlords, in some cases including Al Qaeda), so that problem’s solved; electricity and water have been restored (in selected neighborhoods, to levels a fraction of those before the war), so that problem’s solved; women now have the right to appear in the streets without a burka (which they never had to wear at all before the war, and which they still must wear in areas controlled by reactionary militias that the government can’t control, otherwise they’ll be killed in broad daylight), so that problem’s solved . . . . When we’re gone from Iraq, Al Qaeda will still be there, where in fact they had no presence before the war - and since that was precisely their aim in the first place, and precisely the opposite of that was our stated aim, who, exactly, is winning?

  6. Khatores

    Well, I dunno, but this sort of thing doesn’t help at all…
    [removed link to video -- ed. This should be sufficient explanation]

  7. Annoying Old Guy

    “I see no reason to think that they [Al Qaeda] haven’t applied the same abilities to their overall long-range planning as well.”

    Except for the entire original post. Is that not a discussion of evidence for precisely this point? (I also note that you are reduced to the “stereotyping” rebuttal, which is a good sign of lack of any real evidence).

    I will also note that Al Qaeda’s action have seemed to consist of creating enemies out of friends where ever possible, exemplified by the Jordan hotel bombing. Can you explain how that is good strategic planning, to turn a helpful host nation into an enemy state?

    “removal of Western (especially US) influence from Muslim-dominated regions”

    That’s a fantasy. As long as the USA is a hyper power, it will have influence every on the planet. Just look at the recent re-approachment with Vietnam. Yeah, the NVA totally stamped out American influence there, didn’t they? Almost as well as the mullahs in Iran.

    “specifically, by raising the cost of staying so high that the Western powers will refuse to pay it”

    Note that Al Qaeda and its caliphascist allies in Iraq aren’t aking the cost of staying high for the West and the USA, they are making it high for the Iraqis. Note that Al Qaeda has stopped committing terrorism in the USA since the invasion. (I have to ask, parenthetically, why so many have the view that incidents like the (presumed) massacre in Haditha destroy American influence, but the weekly massacres by Al Qaeda don’t destroy Al Qaeda influence)

    “the establishment of their brand of Islam in those regions”

    That’s not what Al Qaeda says they want. They want the restoration of the Caliphate, i.e. a unitary theocratic government over all Islamic lands. That’s quite a different thing. This restoration would also include the reconquest of former Muslim lands, such as Andalusia, by that Caliphate. Do you really think that’s arguably more realistic than the USA being able to topple regimes it doesn’t like?

    “At any rate, their plan can’t be “psychological”, because that gets them nothing.”

    What do you mean, nothing? This is the root of my original point on imposing Western views on non-Western people. You presume that the members of Al Qaeda have the same geo-strategic sort of motivation that a Western would have. I don’t.

    “As for the rest of your comment, it adds up to the claim that we’re winning and Al Qaeda is getting weaker. That would be fine except that we now don’t control any more of Afghanistan than we did after the initial bombings”

    Which bombings? 11 Sep, Afghanistan, or the 1993 bombing of the WTC? The USA certainly has much more control now than it did at the time of any of those events. More importantly, Al Qaeda and its allies certainly have a lot less (as the debacle of their recent attacks into Afghanistan shows). We are also seeing jihadis leaving Iraq, not entering. But you can have the last word on that if you like, as I doubt flinging cites at each other will change either of our opinions on that.

  8. Ted

    AOG: (I have to ask, parenthetically, why so many have the view that incidents like the (presumed) massacre in Haditha destroy American influence, but the weekly massacres by Al Qaeda don’t destroy Al Qaeda influence)

    If the objective of projecting US power worldwide is to scare the shit out of everyone and convince them they should bend to our will or fear death, then I guess yours is a valid question. Assuming the admin’s objective is something else (”The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people”), then Americans murdering Iraqis would appear to be counterproductive. OTOH, Al Qaeda’s modus operandi is the murder of civilians. It is through these acts that they derive their power and influence.

  9. Sam

    This whole site has made my stomach very queasy. This blog in particular, referring 9/11 as a “spectacular operation.” The writer obviously admires the work of the terrorist. I’m sorry you hate your country so, but as the old saying goes, “if you don’t like it, get out.”

  10. Ted

    Sam, I suppose that old saying you referred to could be applied to this web site as well.

    Most readers here are sophisticated enough to understand the use of the word “spectacular”. You might want to check out the People Magazine web site…

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