Election Integrity
by KevinSeptember 20th, 2006
Any election that uses Diebold machines cannot be trusted:
Felton, that Diebold machines are very easy to hack, specifically that:
Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing amiss. We have constructed demonstration software that carries out this vote-stealing attack.
Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install said malicious software using a simple method that takes as little as one minute. In practice, poll workers and others often have unsupervised access to the machines.
AccuVote-TS machines are susceptible to voting-machine viruses — computer viruses that can spread malicious software automatically and invisibly from machine to machine during normal pre- and post-election activity. We have constructed a demonstration virus that spreads in this way, installing our demonstration vote-stealing program on every machine it infects.
While some of these problems can be eliminated by improving Diebold’s software, others cannot be remedied without replacing the machines’ hardware. Changes to election procedures would also be required to ensure security.
The opportunity for mischief has already occured in at least one election:
Edwards says Prince George’s County voting officials who did not complete the ballot count on Tuesday night, left electronic voters cards in a truck overnight without security.
The Prince George’s Board of Elections stopped counting votes around 2;30 Wednesday morning and resumed around 9:30 a.m. Results from more than 130 precincts were input using computer cards that election officials hand-carried to the board’s office after equipment malfunctions.
Edwards isn’t sure whether the complaint will be filed in state or federal court, but said she intends to take action by Monday.
“I’m really concerned, deeply concerned, about the integrity of the election,” Edwards said.Thousands of provisional ballots, which could determine the outcome of the election are to be counted on Monday.
The legal action is being taken because, “When the [voter] cards were entered, we saw some troubling shifts in the vote count,” Edwards said.
There are many ways to steal an election. Most of them involve keeping voters form the polls: spurious challanges, too few machines, incorrectly set up equipment, flyers and ads designed to send people to the wrong places or on the wrong day, etc. Now we have to be concerned that electronic voting machines can be manipulated. This country is destroying its ability to function as a democracy because no one is taking seriously either voter suppression or vote machine security.
Categories: Politics, Technology |
Or they could do the Democratic thing and register dead folks, cats, children, felons, and illegal aliens.
I still haven’t seen proof of any actual harm done by or to Diebold, only the potential for harm, which is far better than Dem registry drives have done.
If you can get a receipt for your debit card use @ a gas station why can’t the voting machines give you a “receipt” of your vote? I guess wanting your vote counted is a democratic thing after all.
Gattsuru you do not find it weird that a paper receipt is too much to ask? I think voting is a bit more important than a gas receipt!
Gattsuru wrote: “Or they could do the Democratic thing and register dead folks, cats, children, felons, and illegal aliens.”
How about we try to eliminate all voter fraud, regardless of the perpetrator’s party affiliation. Given that the House just voted in favor (largely along party lines, sorry Gat) of new voter ID guidelines, the issue is pertainent. Various courts have ruled that these types of guidelines are unconstitutional. They do little in the way of eliminating fraud, but limit many people’s access to voting booths, particularly the urban poor.
Catherine, I find is surprising that the folks who believe a piece of software which has been analyized multiple times is somehow singificantly less safe than a piece of paper. If folks are able to pick into the machine and get physical access to an interface, they’d have no problem replacing or modifying a standarized piece of paper.
As to voter IDs, I doubt they’d be effective, particularly given other possibilities (say, actually checking against records of dead people/felons), but at least IDs don’t require me to try and get Republican or Democratic polling officials to be honest for once.
Don’t quite understand the constituational issue coming from a party that thinks a full background check doesn’t limit the second amendment, specially when the IDs would be ‘free’ (tax-funded).
Not only would voter ID’s be ineffective, they would discourage voting among some people. I was unaware that registering dead people, children and cats was taking place to a significant degree (to any degree, to be honest) to be an issue. Many people don’t have recognized photo ID’s, passports, driver’s licences or the like; to require ID’s at polling stations essentially eliminates them from the voting rolls. Even supplying ID’s adds another condition to voting, and offers no benefits.
Better we get a consistent method of voting nationwide, and look at ways to eliminate fraud using new voting technology.
But with a piece of paper there can at least be observers present from multiple parties, both political and organizational, to track the ballots. The issue I and many others have with Diebold is the inability to physically track the data.
Also ask yourself if you would feel comfortable with things if Diebold’s owner was giving enormous wheelbarrows of money to the Democrats? Would you be suspicous then?
Tim, Diebold is a publically traded company. It is not owned by an individual. The guy that made the political contributions resigned from the company last year. If the facts matter…
Interestingly, in Maryland, where it just so happened that the Democrats were in power when the decision was made to go electronic, it is the Republicans that are calling for a “return” to paper ballots (which have not been used in decades) and the Democrats are defending the Diebold machines.
As for receipts, I’m pretty sure if I can hack the machine to miscount the vote, I can also hack it to do so downstream of where the receipt is printed. I do believe a system based on the voter creating a hard copy which is maintained as a backup is the most difficult to tamper with on a large scale.
“Interestingly, in Maryland, where it just so happened that the Democrats were in power when the decision was made to go electronic, it is the Republicans that are calling for a “return” to paper ballots (which have not been used in decades) and the Democrats are defending the Diebold machines.”
Agreed!
sorry to belabor points that are out of date. And yes the election in question is between an entrenched and quite corrupt democrat and his challenger. I wasn’t clear that I was refering to the shenanigans in Ohio (which, I agree there is no clear evidence that ‘Kerry really won’) where suspicious behavior occured.
I think if you use such a machine, having a paper copy print-out, that the voter can inspect before placing in the box, would go a long way to assuring people that recounts dont just use the same altered electronic data that the original count was based on. In addition observers should be allowed to well, observe the entire process of collecting and counting votes.
Tim, OK, I agree with you. The term “receipt” threw me off. I thought you intended for the voter to take it with them. But if it is to be left as a hard copy, then we are in agreement as to the general approach.
In a time when virtually all banking, trading and accounting is done electronically (trillions of dollars), I don’t think it is too much to ask that an electronic voting system be designed and implemented that is 100% tamper-proof.
Yes it is, because that is a physical impossibility. I have worked on the network security of large financial firms and while they take their security very seriously, they understand that nothing is 100% reliable.
Another thing to keep in mind when comparing such financial institutions to voting is that the financials spend what it takes to get the best possible security. Try to find elected officials willing to do the same for voting systems. Or who are willing to fire people on the spot for violating security procedures. It’s common to think that the basic problem is technological but in real life most security problems are human problems and can’t be solved by any amount of clever technology.
That said, everything I have ever read about the security in Diebold machines indicates that it’s about as secure as a “DO NOT ENTER” sign on an unlocked door. Keeping a hard copy backup that’s verified by the voter is probably the best we can do with current technology.
P.S. Another reason you don’t want voters taking their receipts home is to avoid pressure to have them show the receipts to bosses / friends / political activists.
Janusz
What AOG said. He is exacty correct on this issue. The entire concept of electronic voting is flawed, for the reasons he sites. We would be much better off with paper ballots and an open counting procedure.
What AOG said. He is exacty correct on this issue.
Wow, that had to have hurt!
I never thought I’d read that coming from you! I certainly never expected to utter this phrase:
I, too, agree with AOG.
I’m not sure AOG was implying electronic voting is inherently less secure than other forms. I for one don’t think it is. Especially when viewed within the context of the entire voting infrastructure (no IDs, volunteer staff, make-shift polling places, etc.).
I have abandoned my quest for 100% security. I now want 99.9999% security. I believe that will foil the “can’t be perfect” counterargument.
Ted
no, electornic voting is inherently less secure. If your bank’s computer messes up your deposit, for example, you know about it rather quickly and you have evidenc ein most cases — deposit slip, cancelled check, etc — that you can use to correct the error. In voting, you have no way to know your vote was wrong and no one has any evidence that votes were changed. Paper ballots have the advantage of being impossible to chang without evidence, and they cannot tell the ote rone thing while they record another. Without 100% security and execution (remember, computer code can introduce errors innocently if it is not perfect) then i thik the risk is too great compared to the best alternatives.
I love computers. I make my living making them get up and dance, but I know their limitations. And their limitations lend themselves to massive fraud or error come election time. I cannot think of any reason to use electronic voting — and feel free to provide some if I missing something — that justify taking that risk.
tgirsch and AOG:
I never thought I’d read that coming from you!”
“Wow, that had to have hurt!
Well, you know, blind squirrels, nuts, that kind of thing
The complexity of the code within a voting machine can be trivial. To the point that one could rigorously prove it to be correct. I too have a fair amount of experience with computers over the past 30 plus years. I’ve worked on mission critical aps for NASA, developed programs used by the Coast Guard to certify sea-worthiness of vessels, produced IETMS used by flight line mechanics servicing passenger jet engines, worked on systems to analyze the strength of ice in Prudoe Bay, and developed multi-million LOC application software that is used by tens of thousands of users - to mention a few. I understand Turing machines, have studied Hoare logic, and can write a 10 page dissertation on the goto statement to refute (well ok, to rebut) Dijkstra. A vote counter is a toy. (apologies for the above pomposity. Felt the urge to establish my computer cred in light of comments by Kevin and AOG)
Once I leave the polling place, I have zero visibility into what happens with my ballot. Be it electronic or paper or mechanical.
In Maryland, a proposed solution to the dangers of the electronic machines is paper ballots and an optical scanner. Of course the optical scanner is an electronic device with software and it counts the votes internally and thus is subject to the same tampering threats as an “electronic” voting machine, but that seems to not matter. The current Diebold machines are a joke. Da Vinci could formulate a better design - heck, he probably did.
Ted
The problem isn’t the complexity of the code. The problem is that there is no way to be sure that something hasn;t been tampered with. Evne in the case of your optical scan ballots, if somehting is fishy the actual ballots are available for hand recounts. Not so in the all electronic machines. And yes, once you leave, you have no real idea what happnes to your ballot. But election judges can see if its gone missing or been tampered with. Not true with purely electronic voting machines under far too many circumstances to make me comfortable.
OT, but my dad was in the Coast Guard. Never had a boat sink on him. Guess I should say thank you