Who slipped some sanity-ogenic drug into Joe’s drink? Not saying I fully endorse the idea, but it sounds unusually reasonable, coming from that source. 
Hilzoy nails it:
People sometimes talk about “doing what it takes in Iraq”, or “giving the surge a chance”, as though such choices had no actual downside; as though letting George W. Bush have his way on Iraq policy was like letting your child pursue some wildly improbable but ultimately harmless dream. “Why not let him try?”, they say, as though he were a teenager hoping to become a movie star, or me trying to make the NBA. This is obviously crazy: nothing about Iraq is harmless. Our soldiers are dying in Iraq; our money is being spent there; our resources are being diverted away from places like Afghanistan, where they might have done a lot more good. And, to top it all off, we are doing damage to our Army that will take decades to undo, and that might prevent us from responding adequately the next time we face a real threat, rather than one that exists only in Bush and Cheney’s imaginations.
As they say, read the whole thing. Also be sure to read the Washington Monthly article she links.
Mitt Romney is on record defending his membership in an (until recently) officially racist religion by citing his family’s personal experience in combatting racism:
These American values, this great moral heritage, is shared and lived in my religion as it is in yours. I was taught in my home to honor God and love my neighbor. I saw my father march with Martin Luther King.
Except that David Bernstein, in The Boston Phoenix, documents the impossibility of that claim.
Alter takes on Krugman taking on Obama:
Paul Krugman is a brilliant Princeton economist and fine columnist for The New York Times who was far ahead of the pack in asserting that George W. Bush is a total disaster as president. His clarity in explaining what academics call “political economy” is without peer. But his attack on Barack Obama on December 17 was wrong on history, wrong on politics and wrong on what the future holds for Obama’s “big table” idea.
Alter then goes on to speak about the Bill Clinton’s economic plan in 1993, Hillary Clinton’s health plan, FDR and Al Gore’s 2000 run as evidence for his assertion that confrontation does not work. I cannot speak authoritatively about the politics of FDR’s second term, but I do remember the 1990s and I thik that Alter is dead wrong about the implications of that time.
First, let’s look at his example of compromise working:
Just after Clinton was elected, he convened a meeting of economists, CEOs, labor leaders and many others in Little Rock. The purpose of the meeting was to argue out what should be done about the ailing economy, with many of the ideas expressed there later becoming part of Clinton’s successful 1993 economic recovery package. The whole thing was on television.
Except that it did not work. Clinton’s economic plan was not as ambitious as the one he campaigned on (it contained no large scale jobs program, for example). And what did he get for this compromise? What did the very theatrical discussions with people opposed ot his plan get him? Nothing. Literally nothing. Not a single Republican voted for his tax and economic plan in 1993. Not one. I am afraid that I do not see how Clinton’s willingness to compromise from the get go is supposed to be an endorsement of the notion that only compromising from the start can get you anything.
Alter then argues that Hillary’s health care plan did not succeeded becasue it failed to do the same kind of theatrical compromise from the beginning:
Sound familiar? This is essentially what Obama is proposing for health care after he’s elected. If Hillary Clinton had done this on health care in 1993—instead of convening a secret task force—she might have been able to build a stronger public case for reform.
In light of the fact that Clinton’s economic plan gained no Republican votes despite doing exactly what Alter wanted Hillary to do, I find this assertion rather odd. It also ignores the political history of the times. The GOP leadership knew that a middle class health care plan would bolster Democratic arguments that government could and should be a force for good in the country. They were quite determined to stop it at any and all costs:
December 2, 1993 - Leading conservative operative William Kristol privately circulates a strategy document to Republicans in Congress. Kristol writes that congressional Republicans should work to “kill” — not amend — the Clinton plan because it presents a real danger to the Republican future: Its passage will give the Democrats a lock on the crucial middle-class vote and revive the reputation of the party. Nearly a full year before Republicans will unite behind the “Contract With America,” Kristol has provided the rationale and the steel for them to achieve their aims of winning control of Congress and becoming America’s majority party. Killing health care will serve both ends. The timing of the memo dovetails with a growing private consensus among Republicans that all-out opposition to the Clinton plan is in their best political interest. Until the memo surfaces, most opponents prefer behind-the-scenes warfare largely shielded from public view. The boldness of Kristol’s strategy signals a new turn in the battle. Not only is it politically acceptable to criticize the Clinton plan on policy grounds, it is also politically advantageous. By the end of 1993, blocking reform poses little risk as the public becomes increasingly fearful of what it has heard about the Clinton plan.
… End of March 1994 - Republicans seize on Whitewater even more aggressively, once more linking it directly with health reform, House Republican Lamar Smith of Texas sends a letter to each of his House colleagues and all their administrative assistants and press secretaries urging them to focus on one theme in their speeches, columns for the press, and media and constituent contacts for the next week: “Whitewater and Health Care.” Included in the four-page letter is a list of suggested attack sound bites and quotes to be used by all GOP colleagues. In all this time nothing has been done by the White House to launch any kind of grassroots support campaign for health care reform.
… July 23, 1994 - Following several days of anti-Hillary rhetoric on local talk shows, Hillary Clinton — at a bus rally in Seattle — is confronted by hundreds of angry men shouting that the Clintons are going to destroy their way of life, ban guns, extend abortion rights, protect gays, and socialize medicine. When she finishes speaking and tries to leave the rally, her Iimousine is surrounded by protesters. Each of the four caravan routes becomes an expedition into enemy territory — with better-armed, better-prepared, better-mobilized anti-Clinton protesters at each stop along the way. Local reform groups and caravan organizers are forced to cancel scheduled stops because of implicit threats of violence.
… September 19, 1994 - The New York Times reports remarks — never subsequently denied — that Bob Packwood made to his Republican senatorial colleagues during closed-door strategy sessions while he was managing the Republican attack during the summer. “We’ve killed health care reform,” Packwood told his fellow Republican senators. “Now we’ve got to make sure our fingerprints are not on it.” For many this is the “smoking gun”: proof of a carefully plotted, and secret, Republican strategy.
Does that sound like a group of people you could compromise with? They were ideologically and politically opposed to even the notion of health care reform and they did everything human to kill it, no matter how much the Clinton’s compromised. Explain to me, please, how a televised meeting with insurance executives would have changed that? The Clinton health care plan failed largely becasue they were terrible at working with Congress and did almost nothing to counter the lobbyist driven opposition ads until it was far too late.
Right from the beginning, Alter tells something close to a lie:
Krugman is a populist. He writes that if nominated, Obama would win, “but not as big as a candidate who ran on a more populist platform.” This is facile and ahistorical. How many 20th Century American presidents have been elected on a populist platform? That would be zero, Paul. You could even include Al Gore, who won the popular vote in 2000. Instead of exploiting the peace and prosperity of the 1990s, Gore ran on a “people vs. the powerful” message. It never ignited.
That’s not exactly true. Gore’s numbers did go up after he adopted that formulation and he did go from noticeably behind to, you know, winning the election. Campaigns are complicated things, especially for the Presidency, but to say that a message that helped turn around a candidacy failed to catch fire is probably stretching the uncertainty past its breaking point.
It is clear that Alter does not like populism and is much more comfortable in a political climate where the only real arguments are around the edges. Too bad for him we don’t live in that time. There are very real and very profound differences between where the GOP wishes to take the country and where the Democrats wish to take the country. Starting with Compromise, as Alter suggests we do, has not had a very good history for progressives over the last twenty-five years. Alter’s own examples demonstrate that to him, if he wasn’t so blinded by his distaste of populism and politics and ideology.
I think Krugman’s critique of Obama is sounder that Alter’s critique of it. Obama does sound like a man who is starting the battle form a position of compromise. Too often he uses right wing frames and focuses on issues that are not central to progressivism but play well with the media elite. It is possible that this is just a clever rhetorical trick, that Obama is winning the media primary as a tool to leverage in his battle for his more progressive goals. That’s a plan that might even work. But when push comes to shove, he hasn’t exhibited much leadership on these issues. He did not lead and has not lead on the war-funding fight, even going so far as to claim that using funding to mandate a withdrawal was damaging to the troops. His health plan is even more of a compromise position that Edwards’ and Clinton’s. He did even show up for Biden’s planned filibuster of the telecom immunity bill. He has not used his positions as Senator and leading Presidential candidate to lea don a single issue, with the possible exception of media policy and governmental openness. But even there, he has been incremental, cautious and not particularly progressive. So far, he hasn’t shown any evidence that his rhetoric is a tool of persuasion rather than a blueprint for his Administration. His plan, it seems, is to be reasonable and expect the GOP to be reasonable right back. That hasn’t happened in my memory, not on any important issue, despite Alter’s faulty understanding of the last two decades.
Royalty was like dandelions. No matter how many heads you chopped off, the roots were still there underground, waiting to spring up again.
It seemed to be a chronic disease. It was as if even the most intelligent person had this little blank spot in their heads where someone had written: "Kings. What a good idea." Whoever had created humanity had left in a major design flaw. It was its tendency to bend at the knees.
-- Terry Pratchett, Feet of Clay
